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Otherness has been a subject of the utmost relevance for continental philosophy 
since the beginning of the 20th century, constituting what might be characterized 
as an otherness turn. Otherness is here understood as the awareness that one has 
that other beings or things have their own separate beingness that is not subsumed 
within oneself. Its essential role in human relations permits the creation of a critical 
perspective of analysis, a “lens of otherness.” Applying this lens to perennialism up 
through its latest iterations reveals some problematic aspects of this approach. By 
contrast, participatory thought may be a more “otherness compliant” alternative to 
perennialism. Whereas perennialism can be seen as being geared toward theoretical 
unification, participatory approaches are arguably guided by an ethos of otherness. 
Otherness is thus advanced as a relevant aspect in the debate on perennialism, 
and participatory thought is proposed as a more viable philosophical frame for 
transpersonal studies.
The public sphere is flooded with a variety of scintillating offers in the interface between spirituality and psychology. Common to many 
approaches is the assumption that the experience 
of oneness is the highest spiritual realization and 
indeed the ultimate goal of spiritual development. 
An example of this can be found in popularized neo-
Advaitan discourse, in which the meaning of advaita 
as “not two” is emphasized (e.g., Katz, 2007). The 
term “nondual” tries to capture this same idea: that 
oneness or unity is the key (Hartelius, 2017b).
Transforming metaphysical theories of 
oneness into a unified theory of spirituality is an 
alluring temptation for scholars who wish to regard 
human spirituality as something more substantive 
than social constructions invented to explain 
psychological aberrations. In the early decades 
of transpersonal theory, for example, emphasis 
on unification led to a privileging of perennialist 
positions. During the last 20 years perennialism has 
been criticized and deconstructed in the course 
of a heated debate, and at least one substantive 
alternative—participatory philosophy—has been 
proposed (Abramson, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Alderman, 
2011, 2012a, 2012b; Ferrer, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2008, 
2011a, 2011b, 2017; Hartelius, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 
2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Hartelius & Ferrer, 
2013; Taylor, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
The debate on perennialism has focused on 
matters such as the Cartesian-Kantian split (Ferrer, 
2002), the metaphysical nature of its basic assertions 
(Abramson, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Hartelius, 2015a, 
2015b, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Taylor, 2016, 
2017a, 2017b, 2017c), and the circular nature of the 
arguments on the supporting evidence (Hartelius, 
2017b). However, an overlooked issue—the 
need for an effective account of otherness within 
perennialist thought—may have influenced both 
the evolution of perennialist thought and the rise of 
a participatory alternative. In order to expand the 
critique of perennialism, the concept of otherness as 
developed within Western continental philosophy 
during the 20th century can be brought to bear. For 
instance, Levinas’s (1961) notion of “imperialism 
of the Same,” his affirmation that ethics and not 
ontology must be the first philosophy (Levinas, 
1984/1989), and his analysis of the tension between 
“Totality and Infinity” (Levinas, 1961), gather 
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valuable insights about otherness that expose 
shadows in perennialist thought. In this way, what 
might be termed an otherness turn in continental 
philosophy may find application in transpersonal 
thought, calling for an otherness vigilance that 
allows theories to be scrutinized to detect where 
aspects of otherness have been neglected or 
inadequately integrated. In this paper, I describe a 
method of critical analysis based on otherness, or 
a “lens of otherness,” and apply this lens to both 
perennialism and participatory thought so as to 
identify additional problematic aspects of perennial 
views that participatory approaches may help to 
resolve (Fernandez-Borsot, 2017). In addition, the 
analysis highlights the need for explicit consideration 
of otherness in transpersonal thought. 
As a working definition, otherness is here 
understood as the awareness that one has that 
other beings or things have their own separate 
beingness that is neither subsumed within oneself, 
nor is absolutely other (cf. Treanor, 2006). Instead, 
it implies an understanding that self and other 
are continually shaped by their engagement with 
each other. While many definitions of otherness 
are possible, this relational understanding of the 
term is congruent with the critique of perennialism 
advanced in this discussion. 
In this discussion, a variety of cultural 
constructs related to spirituality, such as spiritual 
traditions, religions, worldviews, beliefs systems, 
cosmologies, and so on, are indicated by the term 
spiritual frame. I adopt Ferrer’s (2002) classification 
of perennialism in five varieties: basic, esotericist, 
structuralist, perspectivist and typological (see pp. 
77–80)—a classification that sufficiently covers the 
spectrum of perennialist theories inside and outside 
of transpersonal studies. While the latest generation 
of perennialist approaches (Rose, 2016; Studstill, 
2005; Taylor, 2016) may not seem to fit wholly within 
this taxonomy, Taylor (2016) has correctly placed 
them in the perspectivist category (pp. 19, 35), 
though with distinctive features that are discussed 
below.
The Perennialist Debate: The Context
Perennialism is a philosophy of spirituality based upon the following set of assumptions:
1. There is a fundamental unity underlying all 
spiritual frames.
2. This unity can be somehow captured in specific 
formulations, descriptions, representations, or 
doctrines.
3. The reason this capture is possible is because 
there is an ultimate fixed referent for all spiritual 
or transpersonal experiences, which can be 
object of direct experience and therefore object 
of knowledge articulation that is universally 
valid.
4. The direct experience of this ultimate referent is 
the ultimate goal of spiritual development and 
its ending-point, the highest spiritual realization, 
the end of the human quest.
Some important problematic aspects of 
these assumptions have been already analyzed in-
depth in the transpersonal community (Ferrer, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2017; Hartelius, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; 
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013), and here I limit my analysis 
to the perspective of otherness. From this point of 
view, the two most problematic assumptions are, 
first, the pretension that it is possible to establish a 
universal spiritual doctrine that somehow unifies the 
diversity of spiritual frames; I call this the theoretical 
unification attempt. Second is the assumption 
that the ultimate goal or end point of spiritual 
development can be directly experienced, and that 
once that has been experienced there is no further 
realization to be obtained; I call this the ultimacy 
claim.
Perennialism presents a variety of versions, 
as noted by Ferrer (2002), but all of them share 
these set of assumptions, although with different 
emphasis and more or less sophisticated epistemic 
articulations. During the last decade some new 
versions of perennialism have appeared that might 
seem to not comply with all the assumptions, most 
of them outside the transpersonal arena (Rose, 2016; 
Studstill, 2005), and one within it: Taylor’s (2016) 
soft perennialism (discussed later). 
Perennialism is a long-lasting philosophy 
whose origins in the Western tradition trace back 
to at least the Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria 
or the Platonic-Christian synthesis of St. Augustine 
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(Ferrer, 2002, p. 73). After that, it was developed 
in the transition from the medieval period into the 
Renaissance with the works of Nicolas de Cusa 
and the Neoplatonic Florentine Academy (with 
Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola; Schmitt, 
1966). The first to use the term was the 16th-
century Catholic scholar Agostino Steuco. The 
influence of perennialism in transpersonal theory 
came through its flourishing in the first part of the 
20th century through the work of traditionalist 
scholars such as René Guenon (2001) and Frithjof 
Schuon (e.g., 1953/1984), the adaptations of 
Eastern philosophy by Swami Vivekananda (1947) 
and Ananda Coomaraswamy (2019), the esoteric 
teachings of the theosophical society (Blavatsky, 
1888/1978), and most remarkably Aldous Huxley’s 
(1945) popularization of the perennial philosophy. 
Further articulations of perennialism that influenced 
transpersonal thinkers can be found in the works 
of outstanding scholars such as Joseph Campbell 
(1949) and Huston Smith (1958).
Perennialism crystalized into transpersonal 
theory through the work of Ken Wilber (1977, 1979, 
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b, 2001c). Wilber’s work was so influential 
during the first decades of transpersonal psychology 
that his ideas shaped the basic theoretical foundations 
of the field, so that a perennialist-like hierarchical 
ontology became its most prevalent philosophical 
framework (Rothberg, 1986), with nonhierarchical 
models not so much “alternative as complementary 
to a hierarchical ontology” (p. 24). Wilber’s paradigm 
reigned until the end of the 20th century, and though 
it started to be questioned in the late 1980s (e.g., 
Washburn, 1988), it was not until the end of the 
1990s that it received a critique substantial enough 
to dethrone it (see Heron, 1996; Rothberg & Kelly, 
1998). The most incisive and influential critique 
arguably came from Ferrer’s early work (1998, 2000, 
2002), which was partly directed at overcoming the 
flaws inherent in Wilber’s perennialism. Since then, 
the debates around perennialism in transpersonal 
psychology have been multiple and heated at 
times. Arguably, perennialism has been the topic 
that has entertained more philosophical discussion 
in the field. The aim of this paper is to contribute 
to that discussion, responding to the call issued by 
Lancaster and Friedman (2017), and adding to the 
debate the perspective of otherness.
Otherness in Continental Philosophy: 
The Otherness Turn
After centuries of Western philosophy in which metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology 
played a hegemonic role, the beginning of the 
20th century witnessed a pivotal turn with the 
irruption of Husserl’s phenomenology (1900/1970a, 
1901/1970b, 1931/1977). Husserl’s purpose was to 
study first-person conscious experience. Husserl’s 
project quickly revealed to him the essential role of 
intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 1996), and he concluded 
that first-person experience is not independent 
from second-person or third-person phenomena. 
Otherness, the first-person awareness of other 
subjects and objects that are different from the 
self that is aware of them, made its appearance 
as a topic of utmost relevance. Otherness, as a 
condition of possibility for intersubjectivity and as 
a fundamental function in the psyche, was revealed 
to be foundational to experience (Zahavi, 1996, 
1999, 2014). By emphasizing intersubjectivity, 
and the implicit presence of otherness, Husserl 
inaugurated a wide venue of work within the 
phenomenological tradition and beyond: the role of 
“the other” in the psychological and sociocultural 
life. Many brilliant thinkers put otherness at the core 
of their philosophical analyses: Sartre (1943) viewed 
the self as vicariously receiving its being from its 
relationships with others—and therefore subject 
to their judgement—leading to the experience 
that “hell is other people” (Sartre, 1944/2015); 
Merleau-Ponty (1960/1964, 1945/2013) approached 
otherness from a somatic stance; Heidegger 
(1927/1962, p. 149) emphasized the relational 
nature of being, captured in his famous statement 
“Dasein ist Mitsein” (Being is being-with); Levinas 
(1961, 1974, 1984/1989, 1991/1998, 1995/1999) 
focused on otherness as the long ignored central 
topic of philosophy that dethroned metaphysics 
and ontology and rehabilitated ethics as the core 
philosophy; Marcel (1964) insisted on relative 
otherness as opposed to Absolute Otherness; 
Derrida (1967/1976, 1967/1978) playfully noted that 
“tout autre est tout autre” (“every other is wholly 
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other”) to illustrate his notion of différance; Ricoeur 
(1990/1992) viewed the self as interwoven with the 
other through narratives; Kearney (2003) analyzed 
the hermeneutic of otherness; Foucault (1973, 1994a, 
1994b) critiqued the othering process effected 
through knowledge construction and the associated 
normative prescriptions; Deleuze (1994) subverted 
the traditional relationship between identity and 
difference. This list merely samples the range of 
positions inspired by the centrality of otherness.
The intellectual current created by 
the reflections on otherness has overstepped 
the boundaries of philosophy and entered the 
discourse of many other disciplines: Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1977, 1998), intersubjective 
psychoanalysis (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, 1992), 
relational psychoanalysis (Greenberg & Mitchell, 
1983; Mitchell & Aron, 1999), sociology (Bauman, 
1991; Jenkins, 1996), education (Freire, 1970), 
anthropology (Leistle, 2015), and cultural analyses 
(Docherty, 1996; Jervis 1999), to name a few.
Moreover, the increased awareness of the 
relevance of otherness that continental philosophy 
brought during the 20th century flourished in a variety 
of critical perspectives in social sciences. Each one 
of these critical perspectives focused in one aspect 
of human life that served as basis for othering: race 
(Crenshaw et al., 1995), class (Ferguson et al., 1990), 
gender (Benjamin, 1998; De Beauvoir, 1949/2008; 
Irigaray, 1993a, 1993b), colonization (Ferguson et 
al., 1990; Said, 1993), cultural recognition (Taylor, 
1992), cultural expression (Docherty, 1996), cultural 
differences (Jervis, 1999), and even geographical 
analyses (Duncan, 1993; Staszak, 2009). These 
perspectives illustrate how the social construction 
of otherness can be used to oppress and exploit 
individuals and communities.
In this way, the 20th century saw a 
progressive prominence of otherness in philosophy—
an otherness turn which then permeated into social 
sciences and cultural analyses—in synergy with the 
linguistic turn. This otherness turn has increased 
awareness of the relevance of otherness, and of 
the oppression and abuse that can be involved in 
the social processes of othering. The lessons of 
the otherness turn can be summarized in three 
ideas: 
1. Otherness is a core dimension of human ex-
perience, both at the individual and collective 
levels.
2. There has been a historical tendency in Western 
society to use ideas, discourses, arguments, and 
ideologies to oppress and marginalize the indi-
viduals, communities, cultures, and worldviews 
whose features do not adhere to established 
normative models.
3. Therefore, any commitment against oppression 
and marginalization requires ethical otherness 
vigilance.
The emerging prominence of otherness 
as a foundational aspect of humanness may 
well constitute the basis for development of a 
specific critical perspective of analysis capable of 
discerning whether otherness has been neglected or 
inadequately integrated into a given theory. However, 
before such a lens of otherness can be engaged, it 
is necessary to consider whether otherness should 
be conceived in absolute or relative terms. While 
this might seem an obscure distinction, it will be 
shown to have sweeping impact on the ethical 
impact of otherness integration. Absolute otherness 
is otherness qua difference, that is, that difference 
is defined only in separative terms, so that the only 
constitutive aspect of otherness is difference. By 
contrast, relative otherness is the view that otherness 
occurs within a similarity-difference polarity, just as 
the categories of self and other obtain their meaning 
from reciprocal relationship with each other. 
The 20th century saw an important 
debate on this issue of absolute versus relative 
otherness between Levinas (1987/1994, 1991/1998, 
1995/1999) and Marcel (1951a, 1951b, 1964, 
1965, 1995). Treanor’s (2006) extensive analysis 
of this debate considered its ramifications in the 
works of Derrida, Caputo, Ricoeur, and Kearney, 
and concluded that absolute otherness is not a 
viable philosophical position because it leads to 
all sorts of aporias and contradictions. Extending 
Treanor’s analysis, relative otherness is also a more 
generative and useful framing of otherness for use 
as a critical perspective of analysis for the social 
sciences, since defining otherness in terms of a 
similarity-difference polarity provides a pragmatic 
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basis for understanding a variety of psychological 
and social mechanisms. For example, closer to 
the similarity pole one might locate dynamics of 
identification, projection, empathy, symbiosis, 
assimilation, reciprocity, resonance, communion, 
shared worldview, shared values, shared cultural 
traits, the construction of an “us,” syncretism, and 
hybridization—concepts that would be difficult to 
explain based on otherness as absolute, because 
absolute otherness requires an absolute separation 
that permits no continuum, and no relationship, 
between similarity and difference. Likewise, the 
aspect of the continuum weighted toward difference 
can be seen in the dynamics of rejection, alienation, 
marginalization, stigmatization, difference as threat, 
competition, rivalry, and conflicts between cultures, 
races, ethnicities, classes, genders, and social groups. 
However, traces of similarity are also present in 
experiences of difference as enrichment, difference 
as complement, and difference as awesomeness—
common nuances that an absolute otherness would 
not permit.
If otherness is to be employed as a critical 
lens of analysis, then, it seems clear that it will need to 
employ otherness in a relative rather than an absolute 
sense. Relative otherness is not only more pragmatic, 
as noted, but also more capable of cultivating the 
sort of ethical discernments appropriate to critical 
analysis. For example, Derrida’s (2000) analysis of 
hospitality demonstrates the absurdity and distance 
from common human experience that is introduced 
by an absolute interpretation of the term. Derrida 
claimed that any act of hospitality, because it is 
relative and situationally conditioned rather than 
absolute and unconditional, contains in itself a 
primary act of hostility. This led him to coin the 
expression “hostipitality,” reflecting a fundamental 
distrust of human encounters (cf. Derrida & 
Dufourmantelle, 2000). Yet this analysis emphasizes 
only the restrictive nature of human bonds, and 
denies their role in human relations, society, and the 
individual and communal creativity that emerges 
from these.
This lens of otherness finds application 
not only within the social sciences generally, but 
may have specific relevance for those approaches 
within psychology that reach for an understanding 
of spirituality as a natural expression of the human 
person—humanistic, integral, and transpersonal 
psychologies. For example, the topic of transcend-
ence can be considered in either relative or 
absolute terms. For Levinas (1990; Treanor, 2006), 
the very enterprise of mysticism was a deceptive 
pursuit of contact with the transcendent, since in 
his interpretation of the transcendent as Absolute 
Other, no such contact was even theoretically 
possible. By contrast, just as it is possible to 
situate otherness on a continuum that includes 
both similarity and difference, transcendence can 
be located on a continuum that extends from 
immanence. Understood this way, transcendence 
and immanence provide a relational spectrum 
along which a variety of transpersonal notions can 
be situated, spanning from phenomenal encounters 
with immanent spiritual presence to metaphysical 
concepts of a universal Absolute Other. 
However, before applying the lens of 
otherness to questions of human spirituality within 
these more whole person approaches to psychology, 
it is necessary to address a common objection. 
Prevalent in some perennialist approaches such as 
Wilber’s (2001b, 2007) integral theory and Grof’s 
(1998) neo-Advaitin model is the idea that nondual 
states of consciousness and their associated nondual 
stages of development transcend all categories, 
dichotomies, and dualities. Therefore, nonduality 
transcends the limited duality that is implied with 
otherness, and a perspective based in otherness 
has no contribution to make to an ultimate that is 
its superior source. However, the lens of otherness 
is not in competition with nondual or perennialist 
views for the position of dominant metatheory. 
The lens of otherness is simply an analytical tool 
that can be applied within the linguistic realm 
where discussion of nondual states and stages takes 
place; it can also be used to consider aspects of 
such theories that may be problematic in terms of 
their impact on psychological maturity, as well as 
ethical personal and social relations. With these 
preliminaries aside, the discussion turns to how a 
lens of otherness perspective can contribute to the 
analysis of perennialist thought within whole person 
approaches—and specifically within transpersonal 
studies.
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Perennialism Through the Lens of Otherness: 
An Imperialism of the Same
Applying the lens of otherness to the analysis of perennialism brings to the forefront several 
important problems. The first one concerns the 
theoretical unification attempt. The aim of efforts 
at theoretical unification among spiritual traditions 
is to capture the essence of human spirituality. 
Perennialist approaches attempt to create a univer-
sal map of “how things really are” in regard to 
spirituality—that is, they make ontological claims 
about the structure of cosmic reality reflected in 
spiritual systems. Different versions of perennialism 
map this alleged essence in various ways: (a) the 
basic form offers a set of philosophical universal 
principles; (b) the esotericist form describes a small 
set of esoteric paths that remain consistent across 
traditions, and that traverse a shared spiritual territory 
in different ways to the same destination; (c) the 
structuralist form discerns a set of deep structures 
that characterize a universal spiritual developmental 
path; (d) the perspectivist form portrays each path 
as leading to a different facet of the same spiritual 
ultimate; and (e) the typological form sees each 
type of mysticism as a unique expression of a single 
underlying spiritual reality (Ferrer, 2002). 
Epistemic problems associated a Cartesian-
Kantian split implied in this map-like representational 
approach, and the corresponding fall into the 
myth of the given, have been extensively analysed 
(Ferrer, 2002, 2017; see also Rorty, 1979). From the 
perspective of otherness an additional critique can 
be offered: any universal map of “how things are” 
represents not only all the objects in the universe, 
but also subsumes within a single representation the 
myriad of differently located experiences of subjects 
included in that expanse—that is, it assimilates 
others into its own perspective without their 
participation. Here Levinas’s (1984/1989) analysis on 
the relationship between knowledge and otherness 
applies. Levinas noted how Western philosophy 
had embarked for centuries in a mapping process 
that gave ontology and epistemology a prominent 
role—a process in which the other is absorbed into 
the same because the priority is to create functional 
representations of the other instead of engaging with 
its otherness and being transformed in the process. 
Treanor (2006) explained this point of Levinas:
when confronted with otherness, scientists, 
explorers, philosophers, and theologians have 
generally attempted to analyze the foreign phe- 
nomenon in order to learn something—indeed 
ultimately everything—about it. This almost 
invariably entails placing the other within a system 
where it can be understood in juxtaposition to 
other elements of the system. … Otherness is 
thought in juxtaposition to, or in the terms of, the 
same; otherness is other-than-the-same. The goal 
is to convert something unknown (other) into 
something known. (pp. 3–4)
This pressure exerted on otherness to conform 
to how it has been represented is what Levinas 
(1961) called the “imperialism of the Same,” which 
carries out a systematic suppression of the Other. 
This rejection of what is different and disturbing is 
followed by an enforced assimilation of the other into 
what is known and familiar. Western philosophy has 
effected such an assimilation by placing ontology 
(“how things are”) as first philosophy. Ontology as 
it has been developed in the Western tradition is 
focused on producing and refining an overarching 
system rather than on attending carefully to unique 
aspects that defy classification within the current 
state of that system. Therefore, it cannot fully 
accommodate the radical openness to the other 
that ethics requires. In Levinas’s words (1984/1989), 
if one is to respect the other, one must put “ethics 
as first philosophy” (p. 75). If ontology is primary, 
ethics will suffer. In this way, there is a previously 
unexamined ethical liability of the perennialist 
positions: its attempt to create a unified theory 
incorporating all spiritual frames will necessarily 
suppress otherness. The root of the problem lies 
not in a particular version of perennialism, but in 
the very attempt to create a theory about all beings 
without the participation of all beings. What suffers 
in perennialism is then hermeneutics—that is, the 
depth of the other’s experience. The problem is 
not with creating a model that integrates elements 
of many spiritual frames, but with presenting it as 
“the way things are,” as a reflection of the very 
essence of spirituality. A unifying model could 
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instead be presented as an invitation to exploration, 
a hermeneutical container that provides guidance, 
and a proposal to others that does not pretend to 
already encompass them. 
In addition to calling for ethics as first 
philosophy, Levinas reflected a related idea in one 
of his most celebrated works, Totality and Infinity 
(1961). The dichotomy between totality and infinity 
embodies the intrinsic tension between ontology 
and the ethics required by otherness. Ontology 
circumscribes being into a system, and what falls 
outside the system is ignored (annihilated) or forced 
to fit in (assimilated). Ontology, therefore, tends to 
totalization. In contrast, otherness points to what 
falls outside the current system, to infinity, to the 
inexhaustible source of creativity and novelty in the 
universe that overflows any attempt of establishing 
a fixed system.
While the expressions “ethics as first 
philosophy” and “totality and infinity” have become 
emblematic of Levinas’s work, these are by no 
means idiosyncratic aspects of his philosophy but 
reflective of the larger otherness turn in Western 
thought. For example, Dahnke (2001) showed that 
Levinas’s articulation of these ideas represents the 
maturation of ideas that were already prefigured in 
Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger—and Crowell 
(2015) added Sartre to the list. One can also find 
further articulations of this strand of thought in those 
he influenced, as with Derrida’s (1978) “violence 
and metaphysics” (p. 97) or Vattimo’s “Belief” 
(1999).
These core ideas of the otherness turn in 
Western philosophy illuminate an intrinsic shadow of 
the perennialist endeavor. The theoretical unification 
attempted by perennialism retains the essential 
character of totalizing modern philosophical systems 
rooted in the Enlightenment age: Diderot and 
Dalembert’s Encyclopaedia (1751), Laplace’s (1809) 
system of the world, Hegel’s (1807) synthetic system, 
and Comte’s (1835) law of three stages, to name a 
few. Perennialism presents its theories of everything 
as advances, when in fact their structure reflects an 
anachronism that has not come to terms with the 
otherness turn. Perennialism retains the modern 
view of theory as a map, philosophy as “the mirror 
of nature” (Rorty, 1979), and the pretension to locate 
knowledge outside of the intersubjective space (cf. 
Ferrer, 2017). This account contrasts with a view of 
theory as a toolbox (Foucault, 1994a), philosophy 
as an invitation, knowledge as a relational and 
situated task. When considering these ideas in the 
transpersonal context, the contrast is between on 
one hand a conception of spiritual doctrines as 
descriptive or representational and on the other as 
a relational matrix of hermeneutical locations that 
include descriptive and representational elements as 
well as exhortative, soteriological, and prescriptive 
ones (cf. Ogilvy, 2013). 
To give a specific example, in Indian 
philosophy, the exhortative and soteriological 
dimension is primary and prevalent over the 
descriptive and representational one. As Menon 
et al. (2018) explained, “The focus of metaphysical 
discussions in Indian philosophical literature is on 
how to create a dynamic and continuous process 
of spiritual uplift that is not distanced or alienated 
from the lived experiences of the person" (p. 
24). Another example is to be found in Banerji’s 
(2018) clarification of how Sri Aurobindo’s integral 
endeavor must be understood:
Thus integrality in Sri Aurobindo’s integral 
yoga must not be thought of as a Theory of 
Everything that explains the cosmos and claims 
to hegemonize the field of yoga, but rather a 
process psychology leading to an aporetic 
experience of integral consciousness and future 
supramental possibility, for which mind has no 
language. (p. 30)
Transpersonal perennialist models such as 
Wilber’s integral theory do not acknowledge such 
a distinction appropriately. In the attempt to create 
a unified theory from an ontological (descriptive 
and representational) perspective, several mistakes 
are made. First, the original traditions presumably 
integrated in the perennial map are distorted in 
order to force them to fit (Berkhin & Hartelius, 2011; 
Ferrer, 1998, 2002; Hayes, 1994; Kremer, 1998; 
Richards, 1978). Second, some philosophical and 
scientific knowledge used to bolster parts of the 
perennialist map are equally distorted (Bauwens, 
2005; Falk, 2009; Meyerhoff, 2010), and some 
unfounded claims of scientific consensus are 
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affirmed (Meyerhoff, 2010). Third, essential dialogue 
with the current members of the involved traditions 
is omitted, being especially poignant the case of 
many indigenous traditions that are often situated in 
the lower rungs of the perennialist developmental 
scheme (Kremer, 1998). Fourth, the direct translation 
into Western categories of the categories and 
concepts used in non-Western spiritual frames 
constitutes an epistemic, colonialist reduction that 
simplifies the original terms into familiar Western 
classifications, thereby stripping them of much of 
their richness and otherness. The following quote by 
Rothberg (2000) explained this problematic instance 
of the “imperialism of the Same”:
To assume that the categories of current west-
ern epistemology are adequate for interpreting 
[non-Western] spiritual approaches is to pre-
judge the results of such an encounter, which 
might well lead to significant changes in these 
categories. (pp. 175–176)
In the same vein, Ochs (2006) affirmed that 
religious studies will remain colonialist as far as that 
they “tend to remove ‘religious phenomena’ from the 
contexts of their societal embodiments and resituate 
them within conceptual universes of our own 
designing” (p. 126; cf. Hammer, 2001). In addition to 
other shortcomings, then, the unification attempt is 
essentially colonialist in nature. 
In addition to the problems associated to 
the attempt at theoretical unification, the ultimacy 
claim is also problematic. Affirming that a specific 
experience or a specific stage of development is 
ultimate is not affirming anything about that specific 
state or stage, but about all the other states and 
stages: these are necessarily less (less relevant, less 
valuable, less high, less evolved, etc.). The claim of 
ultimacy is a comparative and universal claim that 
has a totalizing character. Thus, it is subject to the 
aforementioned “imperialism of the Same”: once one 
affirms ultimacy, one will feel a strong tendency to 
dismiss anything that challenges it. The human psyche 
is prone to the transition from “how things really are” 
to “how things really should be.” This is what Vattimo 
(1999), drawing on Derrida’s (1978) previous works 
on “violence and metaphysics” pointed to when 
he concluded that every metaphysical ultimate is 
potentially violent. In my view, what Vattimo stated 
is that affirming any metaphysical ultimate places 
ontology over ethics.
Nonetheless, this argument calls for a 
distinction, lest any claim of ultimacy fall into 
this dilemma and all notions of ultimacy become 
meaningless. When a claim of ultimacy is 
accompanied by a claim of uniqueness, that is, with 
the claim that a specific ultimate is ontologically 
the only ultimate, then the problem manifests in 
all its seriousness. That is the case with perennialist 
theories; an example is the way the notion of 
enlightenment is treated, in concomitance with its 
confused importation from Eastern traditions, in 
some New Age circles (Jacobs, 2020). However, if 
ultimacy is relational rather than ontological, then 
a multiplicity of ultimates that occur in a variety of 
relational contexts are simultaneously admitted (cf. 
Ferrer, 2002). Moreover, in a relational context, any 
ultimate necessarily takes the character of a yet-to-
explore ultimate rather than a clear-cut theoretical 
ultimate, because a relational matrix is constantly 
shifting in ways that brings forward novelty. 
Another problematic aspect from the lens 
of otherness concerning the ultimacy claim points 
toward ethical inconsistencies. If one takes a specific 
achievement (e.g., nondual realization) as the 
ultimate spiritual realization, once a human being 
has achieved it there will not be any other aspects to 
develop. This assumption stands in contrast with the 
cases of extremely unethical behavior of some gurus 
who have allegedly achieved this nondual realization. 
Especially poignant are the cases of supposed masters 
that Wilber had previously endorsed as realized 
nondual masters (Conway, 2007; Yenner, 2009). 
This problem led Wilber to complexify his model 
by distinguishing multiple lines of development, yet 
if there is a single nondual ultimate, then all these 
lines must converge and meet in that ultimate, and 
a nondual realization would necessarily reflect an 
ultimate realization of each and every developmental 
line. It would therefore seemingly be impossible for 
a master with a complete nondual realization to fall 
short in any developmental line, including ethical 
development.
This is not to suggest that perennialist 
authors have failed to wrestle with otherness. 
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Analyzed from the stance of the lens of otherness, 
the five modalities of perennialism can be viewed 
historically as successive efforts at the integration 
of otherness—as if the evolution of perennialism 
was being pushed by the requirement for integrating 
otherness. The first or basic variety (beginning of 
20th century until the 1980s) posits that there is 
only one path and one goal. Apparent variations are 
irrelevant and correspond to cultural modulations. 
In this case, diversity is devalued, and with it, 
otherness: if others have experiences which differ 
from the model, then they are plainly wrong, or not 
on the path. 
The second variety, esotericist (beginning 
of 20th century until the 1990s), posits that there 
are many paths but only one goal. By valuing the 
diversification of paths, it introduces an implicit 
valuation of otherness: if the others have a different 
experience is just because they are in a different 
path. Nonetheless, as all the paths must converge 
to the one goal, experiences differing significantly 
from this one goal (e.g., indigenous accounts) will 
be labeled as distant from the goal. The third or 
typological form (1930s to 1980s) admits many 
paths and many goals, but only as instances of a 
finite number of basic types. Diversity is admitted 
but limited. 
The fourth or structuralist type (1990s to the 
present) posits many paths and many goals in surface 
structures that correspond to one path and one goal 
in regard to the deep underlying structures. In this 
case diversification is introduced also at the level of 
the goals, creating more space for otherness. 
However, with the need of characterizing 
the deep structures and distinguishing which 
elements are surface and which elements are deep, 
associated problems appear: who establishes what 
is surface and what is deep? It is often someone 
outside of the relevant spiritual frames who claims 
to discern the difference. Others are then told how 
they should interpret their experience. The fifth 
kind of perennialism, perspectivist (1990s to the 
present), posits many paths and many goals, and 
the unification relies only on the affirmation that this 
diversity corresponds somehow to different aspects, 
perspectives, or dimensions of the same underlying 
spiritual ultimate. This variety of perennialism is 
otherness compliant to the degree that the unifying 
spiritual ultimate remains free from description in 
ontological terms. Taylor’s (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c) soft phenomenological perennialism would 
be a more spacious version of this variety, but it still 
presents some ontologizing (Ferrer, 2017).
Significantly enough, only structuralist 
and perspectivist versions of perennialism, which 
present a better integration of otherness, have 
persisted within the transpersonal field. Even the 
most relevant version of structuralist perennialism, 
Wilber’s integral theory (2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2007), 
has been described in successive phases (Kazlev, 
2009) that also display a progressive integration of 
otherness (for details, see Fernandez-Borsot, 2017, 
pp. 212–232). Taylor’s (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) 
recent version of perspectival perennialism, which 
he has called soft perennialism, is in turn the most 
otherness compliant version of perennialism to 
date. Accordingly, it deserves a specific lens-of-
otherness-based analysis. 
Soft perennialism presents two distinctive 
features: (a) spiritual development is conceived 
as an open-ended process, with no goal, and 
(b) phenomenology is prioritized over ontology 
(Taylor, 2016). Using the lens of otherness, these 
two distinctive features represent an important step 
forward. The first feature is an explicit renunciation 
of the ultimacy claim, and the second softens 
the problems associated with ontologizing that 
are present in the theoretical unification attempt. 
Indeed, the phenomenological turn that Taylor 
proposed can be interpreted as a move toward 
respect for otherness: the phenomenological 
analysis starts from the experience of the individual, 
whatever that maybe, and attempts to honor and 
respect it. The fact that Taylor has repeatedly 
emphasized the secondary role of ontology can 
be seen as a safeguard against the tendency to 
impose a priori statements on the experience of 
the other, an effort to avoid the “imperialism of the 
Same.”
Nonetheless, his articulation still presents 
clear efforts at ontologizing by claiming that the 
most fundamental ground of being can be best 
described as an all-pervading spiritual force, 
which is claimed or assumed to be immanent and 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 10 Fernandez-Borsot
impersonal (Taylor, 2016, p. 29). Following this line 
of reasoning, descriptions of a spiritual ultimate in 
any other terms—for example in transcendent or 
personal terms—would also reference this same 
underlying force, but with added elements that are 
not ontologically present. The problems associated 
with Taylor’s ontological claims have been analyzed 
in depth by Ferrer (2017) and Hartelius (2016b, 
2017a, 2017b, 2017c), and here I merely emphasize 
implications from a lens of otherness stance. If the 
impersonal quality of this speculatively posited 
ultimate ground of being is emphasized over other 
qualities, and if the attribution of any personal 
quality to the spiritual ultimate is seen as an artificial 
addition, then intersubjective relationships are 
intrinsically devalued. Yet there is a problem of 
otherness here: if any transpersonal experience, 
however interpreted, is defined as being actually an 
encounter with an impersonal ground of being, this 
dismisses the possibility of having an experience in 
which something larger than the self is encountered 
as relational love (cf. Levinas, 1961).
Accordingly, while Taylor’s (2016) soft 
perennialism is the most otherness compliant version 
of perennialism, it still retains some problems relative 
to ontologizing an impersonal, immanent spiritual 
realm or force. This issue notwithstanding, his 
research into the phenomenology of certain types of 
developmental experiences may point to important 
commonalities in postconventional development 
(e.g., Taylor, 2010).
Participatory Thought 
Through the Lens of Otherness
The application of a participatory perspective in transpersonal studies arose in response to 
problematic aspects of perennialism (Ferrer 1998, 
2000, 2002). In contrast to perennialist thought, a 
participatory approach expresses a commitment to 
respect and honor the specificities and particularities 
of each spiritual frame, each individual and each 
community—inspired, as it were, by an ethos 
of otherness. Consonant with this full respect 
of otherness, participatory thought provides a 
philosophical container for diversity rather than a 
unified theory. It supplies a frame in which there 
is space for any spiritual frame to exist on its own 
terms, minimizing the need of reinterpretation 
relative to any other knowledge frame outside of 
it—other than the implicit and central challenge 
to any totalizing ontologies such frames may posit. 
This goal is achieved by holding each spiritual frame 
as a particular enaction of the infinite potentialities 
that spirituality offers. Each enaction is brought 
forth into manifestation through a process of co-
creation within a specific social, historical, and 
environmental context. 
In a participatory approach, each spiritual 
frame is like an ecosystem. Each ecosystem is a 
specific, located manifestation of the potentialities of 
biological life. Though there are many commonalities 
between ecosystems (e.g., the ubiquitous presence 
of cells as fundamental constitutive elements), there 
is an imaginative diversity that so permeates these 
systems that one could not claim they reflect a “core 
ecosystem” of what is essential to all ecosystems. 
Indeed, any claim of an essential core would be a 
reduction of the inherently propagating diversity. 
Abstracting similarities from various phenomena 
remains a useful tool for comprehending and 
controlling complex systems to a certain level, but 
ontologizing these abstracted categories into any 
kind of essential structure marginalizes or even 
denies the ways in which the mapping process falls 
short of the territory.
For example, a participatory perspective will 
certainly acknowledge that it is perfectly valid for 
Christians to worship the Trinity. The Trinity is not 
just a social construction, an invention, or a fantasy; 
within the Christian spiritual world it has ontological 
richness and status. Yet just as ecosystems are 
not isolated from one another, so socially located 
spiritual domains interact and engage with other 
domains—both spiritual and secular. A Christian 
who adopted a participatory stance would refrain 
from interpreting other traditions inside a Christian 
framework—which would constitute assimilation—
and would resist attempting to prove that other 
spiritual frames are incorrect or false—which would 
constitute annihilation. This stance does not mean 
that critiques cannot be developed, but rather that 
critiques deserve to be accompanied by genuine 
curiosity and dialogical engagement instead of the 
a priori assumption that one specific spiritual frame 
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depicts “ultimate reality” more fully than another 
(cf. Duckworth, 2014). Moreover, in alignment with 
Levinas’s (1984/1989) call for ethics and not ontology 
to be the first philosophy, the criteria proposed by 
Ferrer (2011b) to develop critical discernment when 
approaching any spiritual frame focus on pragmatic 
results, such as the correction of eco-socio-political 
injustice and the overcome of ego-centeredness, 
rather than on doctrinal-ontological matters. As 
such, critiques of spiritual frames developed by a 
participatory approach will emerge from critical 
engagement with ethical considerations rather than 
from ideological claims. 
Consideration of spiritual frames as enactions 
frontally contrasts with the perennialist approach 
(cf. Ferrer, 2008). While perennialism attempts 
to provide a map with specific slots where each 
spiritual frame is assigned, a participatory approach 
provides an open container where each spiritual 
frame can find its place or places in relationship, 
respecting its own specificities and those of others 
while offering grounds for cross-cultural inspiration 
and criticism. Whereas perennialism provides a shelf 
with a box for each spiritual frame, a participatory 
approach brings an infinite blank canvas where 
each tradition can express and represent itself, with 
the sole condition of ethical considerations such as 
leaving space for others to disclose theirs. While 
perennialism attempts to reduce all traditions to a 
single theory, a participatory approach brings a frame 
in which even totalizing theories are contextualized 
within a permissive diversity. It is in this way that 
a participatory approach encourages respect for 
otherness: it integrates the pole of difference within 
the play of similarity-diversity by calling for each 
spiritual frame to be respected in its integrity in 
return for abstaining from levying judgments on 
other frame—other than ethical critiques of its 
claims for ultimacy beyond its own community, 
or respectful engagement over the impact of its 
doctrines or practices on human wellbeing. 
The similarity pole of otherness, and the 
relational ground in which similarity and diversity 
arise, also need to be integrated within a participatory 
stance. Otherness without similarity can lead to 
either relativistic indifference or tribalism, but a 
participatory approach encourages an engaged 
relationality that responds to similarity with curiosity 
and respect. The very fact of shared being—of 
presence together in a shared world—provides 
ground for similarity. A participatory approach 
differs from typical postmodern approaches by 
affirming that there is a shared world; yet it holds 
back from ontologizing claims about the nature of 
any such shared world. It is in this way that it moves 
from relativistic to relational. At the same time, the 
presence of a shared world needs to be referenced 
in some way that acknowledges its existence in an 
undetermined way. Ferrer (2011b) has referred to 
this as “a dynamic and undetermined mystery or 
generative power of life, the cosmos, and/or the spirit” 
(p. 2), out of which all spiritual enactions—as well 
as secular enactions—are brought forth, through the 
co-creative participation of all the involved beings. 
On one hand, this mystery is both dynamic—that 
is, not fixed—and undetermined. These qualities 
imply that the mystery cannot be described through 
any set of characteristics or attributes beyond those 
embodied in its plural enactions; it transcends any 
conceptual definition, it defeats any theoretical 
unification attempt. On the other hand, it is not any 
kind of “something,” and therefore, while it can be 
diversely apprehended through direct experience, 
it cannot be comprehended. Humans enact this 
mystery through spiritual expressions, and at the 
same time cannot capture its full potential with 
those expressions because we are immersed—
participating—within it. 
At the same time, participatory thought 
does not see the mystery and its enactions as 
separate entities. Continuing with the metaphor of 
ecosystems, it does not make sense to see physical 
ecosystems as separate from the processes that 
shape them. Equally, the mystery is not distinct 
from its enactions, nor reducible to any of them. 
By pointing this idea, participatory thought avoids 
a neo-Kantian dualism between the mystery and 
its enactions, which might spur competition among 
spiritual frames for the status of being less separated 
from the mystery (Ferrer, 2017). 
Given that all spiritual enactions are posited 
to be brought forth out of the mystery, it provides 
a certain sense of unity in the diversity: a unity not 
in terms of a common end-point, but of a shared 
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yet undetermined ground. It is in this sense of a 
unifying principle that Ferrer (2002, 2008, 2017) 
spoke of a “relaxed spiritual universalism.” This 
universalism can account for similarities among 
traditions in a way that acknowledges the similarity 
pole of otherness: the different enactions of the 
mystery are not merely incommensurable realities, 
totally independent from each other. They arise 
from a shared ground, result from hybridizations 
of previous enactions, and continue to be involved 
in processes of hybridization (Ferrer, 2009; Ferrer 
[2017] has acknowledged at least seven kinds of 
equivalences among traditions). 
In this way a participatory approach 
enables unity through otherness by acknowledging 
a common relational ground (the mystery), 
while providing an intellectual strategy to accept 
difference without compromising the integrity of 
one’s own spiritual frame. The mystery functions 
as an evocative construct, exemplifying a yet-to-
explore unknown. When current spiritual frames are 
seen as specific enactions of the mystery that do not 
exhaust its possibilities, the door is open for novel 
forms of spiritual inquiry (Ferrer, 2003; Heron, 1998, 
2006). Spirituality is much more than reproduction 
of past inspirations; it is an ever-present invitation to 
explore and co-create more and more possibilities 
of the mystery: the unfolding unknown of existence 
itself.
A participatory approach overcomes two 
major problems of perennialism: the theoretical 
unification attempt and the ultimacy claim. As 
such, it is much more otherness compliant than 
perennialism in any of its forms or iterations. 
Considering that participatory perspectives arose in 
a moment when the otherness turn in philosophy 
had already influenced Western culture, it seems 
possible that this same otherness turn may have 
been part of the impulse that brought forth the 
participatory endeavor.
Conclusion
The analysis of perennialism through a lens of otherness has highlighted two problematic 
aspects of perennialist assumptions: the theoretical 
unification attempt and the ultimacy claim. The root 
of the shortcomings can be summarized through 
Levinas’s (1984/1989) assertion that ethics, and not 
ontology, must be the first philosophy. Attempting 
to provide a unified theory, as perennialism does, 
puts ontology first—an exercise that exerts a 
marginalizing pressure on those who do not fit 
easily into the unified theory; these are fated to 
distorted assimilation into a perennialist model or 
complete dismissal as irrelevant on account of their 
noncompliant particularities. This coercive influence 
is what Levinas (1961) called the “imperialism of the 
Same” (p. 28). 
Though Levinas provided a synthetic 
formulation of these arguments especially suitable 
for the critique developed in this paper, he is only the 
most visible member of a broad current in Western 
philosophy. This current unfolded throughout 
the 20th century, increasing the awareness of the 
relevance of otherness, and extending its influence 
to social sciences, to the point of promoting a 
variety of critical perspectives rooted in otherness. 
The relevance of this philosophical current suggests 
that important trends of Western thought in the 
20th century experienced what can be called an 
otherness turn.
Given the salience of otherness, I have 
argued that it can be used as the foundation for 
a critical perspective of analysis, which I call the 
lens of otherness. I have provided an outline of the 
theoretical foundation for the lens of otherness and 
have applied it to perennialism to show problematic 
aspects of its fundamental assumptions. I have also 
argued that the evolution of the perennialist thought 
has appeared to respond to the need of improving 
the integration of otherness. Even Taylor’s (2016) soft 
perennialism, though more “otherness compliant” 
than its predecessors, still retains the characteristic 
problems of perennialism.
A participatory approach appears to more 
fully remedy the problems identified in perennialism. 
Indeed, the level of otherness compliance in 
participatory approaches is such that one could 
say they are inspired by an ethos of otherness, a 
commitment to respect and honor the specificities 
and particularities of each spiritual frame, each 
individual, and each community. In this way, it may 
be that the otherness turn of Western philosophy 
can make substantial contributions to the debate 
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on perennialism, showing that otherness is a key 
consideration that unavoidably alters the terms of the 
debate on its viability as a frame within psychology, 
religious studies, or transpersonal studies. By 
contrast, a participatory approach may be a more 
viable philosophical frame for efforts to hold diverse 
spiritual traditions in a relational rather than relativistic 
frame—one that permits a discerning study of their 
uniqueness and similarities as expressions of a shared 
undetermined mystery. 
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1.  This paper is based in part on a dissertation 
submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of 
the PhD degree in Transformative Studies at the 
California Institute of Integral Studies (CIIS). The 
paper was completed during a term as visiting 
scholar at CIIS. I wish to thank Glenn Hartelius 
for helpful and valuable comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper and for the scholar rigor he 
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